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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Ordinary people often make epistemic claims. For example, they claim to know the 
whereabouts of a misplaced book, or that someone else knows whether Jones will be at 
the party, and they might even do something reconstructable as claiming that Suzy’s 
belief is justified even though false or claiming that Henry’s belief is justified and true 
though not a case of knowledge. Insofar as they make such claims, presumably they are 
at least somewhat concerned to do so rightly. Epistemologists make such epistemic 
claims too and are, of course, also concerned to do so rightly. However, they often give 
priority over these epistemological issues to what I think can only be viewed as meta-
epistemological issues. These are issues not about whether this or that epistemic claim is 
correct but about things like the standard for knowledge, the nature of epistemic 
justification, the possibility of rational response to skeptical arguments, and the meaning 
of epistemic claims. 
Concerning this final issue, recent philosophical debate has largely centered on the 
question of whether epistemic claims are plausibly thought to be context sensitive. The 
default assumption has been that sentences that attribute knowledge or justification (or 
whatever else is epistemic) have stable truth-conditions across different contexts of 
utterance, once any non-epistemic context sensitivity has been fixed. The idea, for 
instance, is that sentences of the form ‘S knows that p’ have stable truth-conditions once 
the values of S and p (plus any implicit temporal elements) are fixed. The contrary view is 
the contextualist thesis that such sentences do not have stable truth-conditions but can 
vary depending on the context of utterance. So, for instance, even once we’ve fixed the 
values of S and p the sentence ‘S knows that p’ could still be true when tokened in one 
context, while false when tokened in another context, since the truth-conditions of this 
sentence depend in part on some contextually varying element such as the strength of 
evidence required for knowledge.1 
This debate manifestly presupposes that the meta-epistemological issue of 
accounting for the meaning of epistemic claims is to be settled by determining the truth-
conditions of these claims. I think this presupposition is probably false and, in any case, 
way too quick. This is for two interlocking reasons. First, many epistemologists see 
epistemic claims as evaluative or normative, in some sense.2 However, in the meta-ethical 
                                                
1 See for instance Unger (1984), Cohen (1988), DeRose (1992, 1995, 2009), Lewis (1996), Rysiew (2001), 
Neta (2003), Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005). 
2 See for instance the virtue epistemology of Sosa (1980; 2007) and Zagzebski (1996), but also those who 
think knowledge is a norm of belief, action, and/or assertion, e.g. Pollock and Cruz (1999: ch. 5), 
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debate – which has really become a meta-normative debate – most participants take 
alternatives to truth-conditional semantics, such as expressivism, as live options. Second, 
from a pragmatist view on meaning (that I think makes contact with the remit of ‘social 
epistemology’) a natural way to approach the meaning of epistemic claims would be to 
ask not about their truth-conditions but about what practical function they serve in our 
commerce with one another and other aspects of the world. It could be that, even if we 
agree about the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions, there’s still an important 
meta-epistemological question to be settled about their linguistic and conceptual role. 
These two reasons correlate with two moments in a line of thought whose name I 
have taken for the title of this paper. My purpose in it is to flesh out this line of thought 
and then indicate how I think it could help to enrich meta-epistemological theorizing in a 
way that appreciates the specially social character of epistemic claim-making. 
 
2. ETHICAL EXPRESSIVISM AND EPISTEMIC EXPRESSIVISM 
 
In the meta-ethical debate, ethical expressivists encourage us to ask not about the nature 
of ethical facts or values but instead about the nature of ethical evaluations. They do so 
because they think we can satisfactorily answer the latter question without ever 
countenancing some sui generis kind of thing – ethical facts or values – to answer the first 
question. Their idea is that ethical evaluations are not representations of how the world 
is; rather, they are expressions of our attitudes towards the way we represent the world to 
be. Specifically, ethical claims are seen not as descriptions of the world but as expressions 
of our ethical attitudes towards things like actions, agents’ characters, systems of rules, 
social structures, etc.  
From the perspective of a truth-conditional semantics, which takes notions like 
truth and reference as its master concepts, the semantics for ethical claims that results 
from the standard sort of expressivism will appear quite radical.3 In effect, it is the view 
that ethical sentences mean what they do in virtue of the state of mind that they express, 
rather than in virtue of the facts they purport to represent.  
However, this semantical idea is not without at least some historical inspiration and 
contemporary allies in the philosophy of language. A rich alternative semantic program, 
which is at home with this idea across the board, traces back through Grice at least to 
Locke. This is the ‘ideationalist’ or ‘psychologistic’ approach to meaning, which is 
inspired by Locke’s view that ‘Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand 
for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them’(1689: 405). In its 
contemporary manifestation, the project is to understand semantic content in terms of 
conventional regularities linking overt use of a sentence with a particular idea or state of 
mind.4 Accordingly, all sentences are thought to mean what they do in virtue of the state 
of mind that they express. And, if we embrace this idea in our philosophy of language, it 
then opens up room for the expressivist to argue that the conventional regularities of our 
language are such that descriptive sentences mean what they do in virtue of expressing 
specific beliefs while ethical sentences mean what they do in virtue of expressing specific 
                                                
Williamson (2001), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), and those who follow Sellars (1956) in thinking that 
knowledge attributions ‘place one in the space of reasons’, e.g. Williams (1992; 2001), Brandom (2000: ch. 
2) and Rosenberg (2002). 
3 In Bar-On and Chrisman (2009) and Chrisman (2009: §5), nonstandard forms of expressivism are 
explored, which attempt to be semantically neutral. However, in this paper about the meaning of 
normative claims, such as epistemic claims, I set those views aside as not addressed to the present issue.  
4 See Grice (1957), Schiffer (1972), Davis (2003). 
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desire-like moral attitudes. Because of this, I think expressivism is naturally married to an 
ideationalist alternative to truth-conditional semantics.5 
But what exactly does the expressivist say is the desire-like moral attitude 
expressed by ethical sentences? The details won’t matter much here, but to have a toy 
expressivist theory on the table, we can use a simplification of Gibbard’s (1990) leading 
idea. That is, we can think of the sentence ‘X is good’ as meaning what it does in virtue 
of the fact that it express one’s acceptance of a system of ethical norms which one 
believes to encourage the promotion of x.6 Expressivist views like this one purport to 
carry at least two theoretical advantages, which I’ll now try to characterize in a rough and 
ready way. 
First, expressivist views claim to have a very simple and intuitive explanation of the 
apparent practicality of ethical discourse. The rough idea is that the making of ethical 
claims seems to be intimately and causally linked with motivation to action; if, for 
example, one judges that giving to charity is good but displays no motivation to give to 
charity, then something seems to be amiss. And on a popular Humean view7 motivation 
to action always requires the agent to have some desire-like attitude. Expressivism gives 
us just such an attitude in its account of what is expressed by ethical claims, which 
generates its explanation of the intuitive practicality of ethical claim-making.  
Second, expressivist views claim to avoid queerness/placement problems for 
ethical facts and values. This is initially an ontological issue, but it is closely related to a 
conceptual issue having to do with a different sense in which ethical discourse is 
intuitively practical. The initial idea is that ethical facts, conceived as judgment-
independent facts in the world, seem to be neither ontologically reducible to other facts 
whose existence is not in question nor locatable in the spatio-temporal world governed 
by empirically discoverable physical laws. Why? Because ethical judgments seem to have 
a special connection to motivation to action. Roughly, they seem to commit their author 
to a reason to act in a particular way, irrespectively of any desire to do so. For example, if 
one judges that giving to charity is good, then one seems to be committed to thinking 
that there is a reason to give to charity. If we view such judgments as representing the 
world, then they purport to describe facts which, if they existed would seem to have the 
power to attract our wills irrespective of our desires. This can make ethical facts appear 
queer in the sense that they purport to have a reason-giving power not had by any other 
kind of fact.8 Now, there is plenty of room for debate about whether this is the only 
plausible conception of ethical concepts and facts or whether the reduction of ethical 
facts to less queer facts is after all possible. However, because of the very controversies 
involved in this debate, any meta-ethical view ontologically committed to ethical facts or 
values bears a theoretical cost not borne by views that do not. Expressivism claims to 
                                                
5 Compare Schroeder (2008) and Chrisman (ms) for more discussion of the semantic commitments of 
expressivism.  Early expressivists like Ayer and Carnap can be plausibly read as denying that ethical terms 
have semantic value at all.  However, this has come to seem increasingly implausible, which is why most 
recent expressivists should be read, I believe, as relying on an ideationalism as their general semantic 
approach. 
6 His is, at its core, a theory of judgments about rationality rather than a theory of judgments about 
something being good.  I’m simplifying for present purposes.  What he actually writes is this: ‘An observer, 
we may assume, accepts at least an incomplete system of general norms; call that system N.  He then 
thinks an alternative rational if and only if he thinks it N-permitted—that is to say, rational according to 
N…whether an alternative is N-permitted is a matter of fact, and so a belief that the alternative is N-
permitted is a factual belief.  Thinking X rational, then, is a combination of a normative state and a state of 
factual belief’(1990: 91) 
7 See especially Davidson (1980: 5), Smith (1987; 1990: ch. 4). 
8 See Mackie (1977: ch. 1). 
 4 
avoid this cost in its contention that ethical concepts (and perhaps normative concepts 
more broadly) have their distinctive function in making claims that express desire-like 
attitudes rather than describe or represent the world.9 
That’s a brief gesture at what ethical expressivism is and two reasons for endorsing 
it. It’s a curious fact that very few philosophers have sought to defend or even 
recognized the theoretical possibility of a meta-epistemological analogue to ethical 
expressivism.10 This is in spite of several obvious parallels: First, it’s now commonplace 
(even if still controversial) for philosophers to insist that epistemic notions like 
‘knowledge’ and ‘justification’ are normative, and many epistemologists are interested in 
norms of belief.11 Second, some epistemologists have become quite puzzled about the 
nature and location of epistemic values, thinking now that if the value of knowledge were 
merely instrumental value for the goal of truth that it would be ‘swamped’ once one has 
the truth by whatever means.12 Third, several pragmatist-inspired philosophers have 
asked about the social role of epistemic concepts such as ‘knowledge’ and come up with 
an account according to which this concept is not used directly to describe people but 
rather to do something like compliment (Rorty 1979; 1995), tag (Craig 1990), or keep the 
books on the ways in which various people track, process, and transmit information 
(Brandom 2000: ch. 3, Rosenberg 2002: ch. 5). 
In an earlier paper (Chrisman 2007), I provisionally argued for a version of 
epistemic expressivism not on the basis of these parallels but on the basis of the fact that 
it addresses two pervasive objections to epistemic contextualism while retaining the 
advantages of that view. I want to leave this argument to the side here, except to say that 
what resulted was a view that encourages us to ask not about the nature of epistemic 
facts and values but instead about the nature of epistemic evaluations. It did so with the 
typical hope of expressivist views to answer the latter question without ever needing to 
countenance some sui generis kind of thing – epistemic facts or values – to answer the 
former question. The idea is the same as before: epistemic evaluations are not seen as 
representations of how the world is; they are seen as expressions of our attitudes towards 
the way we represent the world to be. In particular, they involve expressions of our 
distinctively epistemic attitudes towards things like believers, beliefs, and types of 
evidence and justification. 
Just like before, from the perspective of truth-conditional semantics, the resulting 
semantics for epistemic claims is apt to seem quite radical. However, epistemic 
expressivists seem to have at least some support from ideationalist or psychologistic 
approaches to meaning on their side (as well, of course, ethical expressivists) in arguing 
that epistemic sentences could mean what they do in virtue of the state of mind that they 
express, rather than in virtue of what they represent. 
The epistemic parallel to the toy version of ethical expressivism above would hold 
                                                
9 Some expressivists such as Ayer (1936), Stevenson (1937), and Gibbard (1990) have assumed that this 
commits them to denying the truth-aptness of ethical claims. However, more recent expressivists such as 
Blackburn (1998), Timmons (1999), Gibbard (2003) and Ridge (2009) have sought to avoid this 
commitment in various ways. 
10 One exception to this is ethical expressivists pursuing the “quasi-realist” program of reconstructing the 
language of realism within an antirealist expressivism. Thus, both Blackburn (1996: 87; 1998: 318) and 
Gibbard (2003: 235) argue briefly for extending their ethical expressivism to cover epistemic claims. 
Outside of that, Field (1998) and Heller (1999) have sketched views of particular epistemic claims that 
might be read as expressivist views, although they have not been worked out in very much detail. 
11 Compare citations in note 2 above. 
12 See for instance Kvanvig (2003), Pritchard (2007), and the papers collected in Haddock, Millar, and 
Pritchard, eds. (forthcoming). 
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something similar about attributions of justification and knowledge. For example, it 
might hold that to say ‘S is justified in believing that p’ is to express one’s acceptance of a 
system of epistemic norms which one believes to positively value S’s belief that p. And, 
sloughing over a few details, we might extend this by claiming that to say ‘S knows that 
p’ is to express one’s acceptance of a system of epistemic norms, which one takes to 
positively value S’s true belief that p. In addition to retaining advantages of contextualism 
while overcoming two of its problems (if the argument of my previous paper is correct), 
this view would carry at least one of the same theoretical advantages as ethical 
expressivism.  
This is the second advantage mentioned above: Epistemic expressivism would 
avoid queerness/placement problems for epistemic facts and concepts. Philosophers 
have been less concerned about the ontological status of epistemic facts and values than 
ethical facts and values; however, arguably, whatever naturalistic inclinations motivate 
concern about the queerness/placement of ethical facts or concepts, the same naturalistic 
inclinations should motivate the same concerns about epistemic facts and concepts, 
insofar as we’re conceiving of these as genuinely normative (whatever, exactly that 
means). If that is right, then epistemic expressivism would avoid an 
ontological/conceptual cost in its contention that epistemic concepts function like 
ethical concepts to make claims that express attitudes rather than describe or represent 
the world. 
The other advantage typically claimed for ethical expressivism was its intuitive 
explanation of the practicality of ethical discourse, and it is perhaps because epistemic 
discourse isn’t seen as similarly practical that epistemologists have ignored that accounts 
of the meaning of epistemic claims that don’t turn on the truth-conditions of these 
claims, such as expressivist accounts. After all, claiming, e.g. that Plato didn’t know 
things about Google doesn’t seem to be as tightly connected to being motivated to act in 
a particular way as claiming, e.g. that charity is good. However, although I think it’s 
probably correct that epistemic discourse is not practical in exactly the same way that 
expressivists claim that ethical discourse is practical, I suspect that epistemic discourse is 
interestingly practical in another sense that encourages rethinking the pervasive 
presupposition in epistemology about how best to approach an account of the meaning 
of epistemic claims. 
More on this in §4, but first I want to discuss another – to my mind, better and 
more general – reason for being wary of epistemic expressivism as an account of the 
meaning of epistemic claims.13 A brief and somewhat dogmatic discussion of the 
notorious Frege-Geach problem in meta-ethics will help to expose this reason. 
 
3. EXPRESSIVISM’S DISCONTENTS 
 
There are other views going under the label ‘expressivism’ on the meta-normative 
scene14, but one of the main challenges for views, which hold that normative claims 
mean what they do in virtue of the type of desire-like attitude that they express, is to 
explain, in a systematic way, the logic of normative concepts in all of their uses. 
                                                
13 Kvanvig (2002: ch. 7), Cuneo (2008: ch 5-6), and Lynch (forthcoming) have argued that epistemic 
expressivism faces special problems not faced by ethical expressivism. These arguments are discussed and 
rejected in Carter and Chrisman (ms).  
14 For example, Copp (2001) defends a view he calls ‘realist expressivism’, where the expressive function of 
ethical claims is seen as deriving from something other than their semantic content. See also the papers 
cited in note 3 above. 
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Normative concepts are clearly used not only atomically but also in logically complex 
contexts. We say things not only like ‘X is good’ but also like ‘If x is good, then y is 
good’; not only like ‘S’s belief that p is justified’ but also like ‘If S’s belief that p is 
justified, then S’s belief that q is not justified’. If expressivists say that the atomic claims 
mean what they do in virtue of expressing a desire-like attitude, what will they say about 
the logically complex claims? It seems that one could endorse these claims without 
expressing a desire-like attitude (towards x or y, or towards S’s belief that p or S’s belief 
that q). This is the Frege-Geach problem (Geach 1965). 
In my view, ethical expressivism in its early forms suffered the Frege-Geach 
problem because, in effect, it treated the meaning of normative predicates as given 
completely by the expressive force of applying them in making an atomic normative 
claim. This is why Ayer suggested that atomic moral claims like ‘Stealing money is wrong’ 
have no factual meaning and express no proposition. But such a view is hopeless when it 
comes to explaining the semantic properties of normative predicates embedded in force-
stripping contexts such as conditionals. There must be some stable content between 
‘Stealing money is wrong’ and the antecedent of ‘If stealing money is wrong, then it will 
be good thieves are punished’, if we’re to view a modus ponens inference proceeding 
from these premises to be innocent of the fallacy of equivocation. 
Interestingly, Ayer’s view of complex normative sentences of another type may, if 
suitably generalized, provide some traction against this problem. For the case of a 
complex normative sentence, he suggested that the sentence has descriptive content that 
is presented in a particular way. His example is the claim ‘Your stealing that money was 
wrong’, and he suggests that it expresses the proposition that you stole that money, but it 
presents this proposition in a special way that could in principle be replaced by a special 
form of exclamation marks indicating a speaker’s contempt for the action mentioned. 
What’s interesting is that this can help to capture some stable content across 
unembedded and embedded contexts for such complex claims. For Ayer can say that the 
same proposition is the content of the antecedent of ‘If your stealing that money was 
wrong, then you will be punished’. 
A problem with this, of course, is that we need to explain the content of not only 
complex moral claims but also atomic moral claims. But many latter-day expressivists 
have sought to overcome this problem by also holding that atomic claims have both 
descriptive and evaluative aspects.15 It is highly controversial whether any of these 
enriched expressivist views work, but, rather than get into the trenches of that debate, I 
want to point out that, insofar as these views continue to operate within the general 
ideationalist approach to meaning, they can still be fit into Ayer’s heuristic at least this 
                                                
15 In addition to the quote from Gibbard in note 6 above, compare Gibbard (1990: 93) and Ridge (2006) 
for the most explicit examples of this strategy. Both, however, echo Hare’s (1952: 18-20) distinction 
between the neustic and phrastic elements of meaning. One possible exception to this is Blackburn 
(1988/1993), who argues that logically complex sentences serve a particular commissive function; that is, 
they ‘tie one to a tree’ of conditional commitments. For example, the claim ‘If your stealing that money 
was wrong, then you will eventually be punished’ commits its author to the content of its consequent if she 
is committed to the content of its antecedent, and to the negation of its antecedent if she is committed to 
the negation of its consequent. I think approaches of this sort are quite promising; however, they seem to 
me to rest on a tacit abandonment of the ideationalist alternative to truth conditional semantics, from 
which expressivism seemed to receive some shelter from objections to its implicit semantic assumptions. 
For to hold that logically complex statements involving normative predicates mean what they do in virtue 
of ‘tying one to a tree’ of conditional commitments is to endorse something much more like a conceptual 
or inferential role semantics. If that’s right, then the resulting view may be consistent with the advantages 
traditionally claimed for expressivism (more on this below), but I think it can no longer be fairly thought of 
as a species of the view that ethical claims mean what they do in virtue of the mental states that they 
express.  
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far: normative sentences are still viewed as having a particular descriptive content that is 
presented in a special normative way that could in principle be replaced with a special set 
of exclamation marks expressing the relevant desire-like attitude.  
For example, we can already see how this is the case with our toy version of ethical 
expressivism above. The idea was that a sentence of the form  
‘X is good’  
expresses the acceptance of a set of norms N, which one takes to encourage promoting 
x. Here the descriptive content is that  
N encourages promoting x  
and it is presented, so to speak, in the mode of one who accepts N. Thus, on the view, it 
seems that we could in principle replace the claim ‘X is good’ with ‘N encourages 
promoting x!!’, where the ‘!!’ indicates that the speaker accepts N. When the normative 
predicate is embedded in a force-stripping context, the point remains the same. For 
instance, the sentence  
‘If x is good, then y is good’  
might be thought to have the descriptive content that  
if N encourages promoting x, then N encourages promoting y  
which is presented in the mode of one who accepts N. Thus, it could, in principle be 
replaced with ‘If N encourages promoting x, then N encourages promoting y!!’, where 
the ‘!!’ indicates that the speaker accepts N. 
No mature version of expressivism deploys Ayer’s heuristic tactic so baldly, but I 
think most can be fit into the general model.16 Because of this, however, I worry that 
they trade on an impoverished view of what a normative concept could be. To appreciate 
this, let me contrast two conceptions of concepts.17 
There is a strong tradition in cognitive science of viewing concepts, especially 
those often deployed in observation as asymmetrically dependent labels or classificatory 
devices. On this view, concept possession is a discriminatory ability: to possess the 
concept C is to be reliably disposed to respond differentially to things in a particular 
class, the C-things. For instance, the concept ‘red’ is, on this view, a classificatory device 
for the red things; to possess this concept is to be reliably disposed to respond 
differentially to red things (under normal circumstances and with the right sort of 
prompting) with the word ‘red’ (or some suitable analogue), i.e. to be able to classify 
things as red or non-red.18 
Another tradition dominates the philosophy of logic, where concepts are seen as 
logically articulable functions or nodes of inferential (evidential and/or justificatory) 
relations. On this view, concept possession is a rational ability: to possess the concept C 
                                                
16 One possible exception is the version of expressivism explored in Schroeder (2008), which seeks to 
reconstruct the compositionality and semantic properties of normative statements in a general expressivist 
framework. However, in order to capture the semantic properties, he ends up forcing the expressivist to 
reconstruct notions of validity and entailment for all statements (both normative and nonnormative) in a 
global expressivist account of language – that is, all indicative sentences are thought to mean what they do 
in virtue of the desire-like attitude of ‘being-for’ that they express. Even if this view escapes the criticism I 
go on to levy in the text above, it is not a very plausible view. As Schroeder himself concludes, it is ’an 
extremely unpromising hypothesis about the workings of natural language’(2008: 179).  
17 This is a simplification of a distinction deployed in Brandom (2009) drawing on Sellars (1956). 
18 For philosophical expositions of theories of concepts which are at least inspired by this general tradition, 
see Dretske (1981) and Fodor (1990), though both Dretske and Fodor pursue more complex models, 
anticipating many of the most natural objections to the crude summation of the tradition presented in the 
text above. 
 8 
is to be able to draw the right sorts of inferences to and from applications of the concept 
C. For instance, the concept of conjunction is, on this view, the node of the inferential 
relations between judgments deploying this and other concepts; to possess this concept 
is to have the ability to make (some substantial portion) of these inferences—e.g. from ‘P 
and Q’ to ‘Q’ and from ‘P’ and ‘Q’ to ‘P and Q’.19 
Which conception of concepts is correct? I think both conceptions capture 
something that is important about at least some concepts, so I’d say neither is correct if it 
is meant to capture all that there is to concepts and concept possession. However, when 
it comes to the nature of human concepts and especially our normative concepts, I think 
the inferentialist conception has some claim to being more illuminating and fundamental. 
For one thing, it doesn’t have to deny that concepts sometimes serve as classificatory 
devices, it just claims that there’s more to human concepts. For another, when concepts 
have a richer logic than is captured by their possible use as classificatory devices, this 
view can explain this logic. This seems to be especially apt when it comes to logical 
concepts such as ‘necessary’, but it may extend to other concepts such as normative 
concepts too. Even those concepts, which are unquestionably observational, might be 
thought to embody inferential nodes. For example, it’s plausible to think ‘x is red’ implies 
‘x is colored’ and ‘x is crimson’ implies ‘x is red’. And this could be relevant for 
determining their classificatory function. 
 I bring up this distinction between the two views of concepts because I suspect 
that expressivists are, to put things somewhat crudely, tacitly conceiving of normative 
concepts as classificatory devices rather than as nodes of inferential relations. It’s not that 
they think that a normative concept such as ‘good’ is analogous to an observational 
concept such as ‘red’ in bearing an asymmetric relationship to all and only the good 
things. That would be a form of realist cognitivism. Rather, it seems to me that they treat 
ethical concepts such as ‘good’ as partially second-order devices for classifying the things 
towards which we (the concept-users) have a certain desire-like attitude in virtue of 
certain descriptive properties of the things.  
In other words, although, on the expressivist view, ‘x is good’ clearly doesn’t 
describe x as something the speaker approves of, it does classify x as one of the things to 
which the speaker has a specific desire-like attitude of approval.  The same is true even in 
logically complex contexts such as a conditional. For example, on the expressivist view 
of the sentence ‘If x is good, then y is good’, neither x nor y is classified as 
unconditionally good. But they are classified as standing in a certain relation with respect 
to the things the speaker approves of – basically, if x is in the class of things the speaker 
approves of then so is y. This is why we can reconstruct the expressivist’s view of 
normative sentences as one according to which they have descriptive content that is 
presented in a special way, which we could in principle replace with a certain kind of tag 
or label, e.g. the special exclamation marks from Ayer.  
On this way of thinking of things, to possess a normative concept is to be disposed 
to respond differentially to the things towards which one has a certain desire-like attitude 
(under normal circumstances and with the right sort of prompting) with the word ‘good’ 
(or some suitable analogue). This is why the expressivist has such an easy time explaining 
the intuitive practicality of normative discourse, as explained above. However, just as I 
think the general conception of concepts as classificatory device will have a hard time 
explaining, in general, the logic of human concepts, I think the view of ethical concepts 
which seems to be tacit in expressivism, is likewise bound to have a hard time explaining 
                                                
19 For philosophical expositions of theories of concepts which are inspired by this general tradition, see 
Sellars (1956), Dummett (1974), Rosenberg (1974), and Brandom (1994; 2000; 2009). 
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the logic of ethical concepts.  
There may be a structurally adequate expressivist response to the Frege-Geach 
problem. That is to say that there may be a version of the expressivist idea that 
normative claims express desire-like attitudes, which is capable of assigning different 
mental states to different sentences as a way of giving their meaning at whatever degree 
of logical complexity. However, as long as the aspect of normative sentences that makes 
them normative is conceived of as a second-order desire-like classificatory device, I think 
expressivists will be stuck with an impoverished view of normative concepts. This is not 
to say that it is wrong to view normative concepts as (partially) second-order 
classificatory devices, for that idea may very well capture an important aspect of these 
concepts. However, especially in the normative case, it seems to me that this cannot be 
the most illuminating or fundamental story, since it doesn’t explain the inferential 
(evidential or justificatory) relations in which normative concepts stand. 
This is, I think a better reason for being wary of expressivism, and it may seem to 
be even more pressing in the case of epistemic expressivism than in the case of ethical 
expressivism. For perhaps philosophy is still influenced by positivist undercurrents 
enough to take seriously the idea that ethical concepts are somehow attitudinal 
classificatory devices rather than inferential nodes. However, positivism’s influence 
hasn’t extended far enough to make the idea that epistemic concepts are attitudinal 
classificatory devices rather than inferential nodes equally acceptable. Epistemic concepts 
clearly have a robust logic, and it seems to be one entirely parallel to other nonnormative 
concepts. This is something that I think any view of normative concepts, which turns 
implicitly on the cognitive science conception of concepts rather than the philosophy of 
logic conception of concepts, is bound to fail to explain. 
 
4. INFERENTIALISM AS A NEW META-ETHICAL AND META-
EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIEW 
 
Summing up before moving on: Meta-epistemology has largely presupposed that debates 
about the meaning of epistemic claims will be settled by determining the truth-conditions 
of these claims. I’ve claimed that this obscures meta-normative views like expressivism 
which explain the meaning of the target claims in terms other than truth-conditions. 
However, in both meta-ethics and meta-epistemology, although expressivism claims 
certain theoretical advantages, it also seems to tacitly assume a view of normative 
concepts that will not be taken to be the most fundamental story in the epistemic case 
and, anyway, is impoverished enough to wonder whether it should be taken as the most 
fundamental account of any concepts at all. 
In light of the distinction between the two views of concepts, I now want to 
suggest a way to retain the advantages of expressivism without incurring the problem 
I’ve raised for it. The strategy will be to pick up on the idea of concepts as inferential 
nodes and to sketch the rudiments of a new meta-normative view with this at its heart. 
As a first pass, this view can be seen as involving three related elements.  
First, it says that we should think of normative concepts not (merely) as 
classificatory devices (even at the second-order) but as nodes of inferential relations. 
Which inferential relations? It is difficult to say in general and exhaustively, but these will 
comprise all of the standard logical relations (like modus ponens and modus tollens 
inferences) and the conceptual connections between these concepts and other concepts 
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(e.g. ought implies can, knowledge implies truth, etc.).20  
Second, it says that we should recognize the distinctively practical kinds of 
inferential relations in which some normative concepts are caught up. For example, while 
‘S ought all things considered to do A’ may have the theoretical implication that ‘S can 
do A’, from the first-person, ‘I ought all things considered to do A’ may have the 
practical implication ‘I shall do A’ (where this is not the expression of a prediction but 
rather the expression of an intention). Likewise, while ‘S knows that p’ may have the 
theoretical implication ‘S believes that p’; from the first person, ‘I know that p’ may have 
the practical implication ‘I shall act as if p is true’ and/or ‘I shall stop inquiring as to 
whether p’ (where this is not the expression of a prediction but rather the expression of 
an intention). In effect, here we get a distinction between two different sorts of 
inferential roles: the theoretical inferential roles that normative concepts may share with 
descriptive concepts and the practical inferential roles that mark them out as different. 
Third, it says that we should retain, if only provisionally, the popular idea that 
intention and belief have different directions of fit with the world, such that, if two 
people believe incompatible propositions to be true, their disagreement presupposes 
some fact of the matter about who is right, whereas, if two people intend to make 
different propositions true, their disagreement doesn’t by itself presuppose some fact of 
the matter about who is right. 
Now, if we hold that normative predicates and the sentences in which they figure 
mean what they do in virtue of their inferential role, so construed, I think we get an 
alternative to both truth-conditionalism and expressivism, as accounts of the meaning of 
normative claims. We might call this view normative inferentialism (with ethical inferentialism 
and epistemic inferentialism as two species).21 Its attractiveness depends on its ability to 
retain the advantages of expressivism while enriching the conception of normative 
concepts in a way that avoids expressivism’s problems. I’ve just said how it enriches the 
conception of normative concepts by moving beyond classificatory devices to inferential 
nodes. I’ll illustrate separately how it might retain the advantages of ethical expressivism 
and then turn to epistemic expressivism.  
In the meta-ethical debate, expressivists claim an easy explanation of the intuitive 
practicality of ethical discourse. However, above, I distinguished two senses in which 
ethical discourse is distinctively practical. There is, an issue in, so to speak, the order of 
causes: those who make certain sorts of ethical claims tend to exhibit correlated 
motivations. By contrast, there is an issue in the order of reasons: one can, it seems, 
make ethical claims to justify actions. I think ethical inferentialism is consistent with 
many different explanations of the first sense in which ethical discourse is practical. 
Indeed, it is consistent with the idea that ethical claims express desire-like attitudes that 
serve, in the order of causes, to motivate the expected action (although, it won’t put this 
idea to the same work in the theory of meaning that the expressivist does). However, 
ethical inferentialism offers a novel explanation of the second sense in which ethical 
discourse is distinctively practical. By treating ethical predicates as standing in inferential 
relations with the predicates that serve in the expression of intentions, we can explain 
more than just why ethical claim-making tends to cause certain motivation, we can 
                                                
20 In this way, the account bears some similarity to Wedgwood’s (2007: ch. 4-5) conceptual-role semantics 
for normative claims. However, I differ from Wedgwood in thinking that conceiving of meaning in terms 
of inferential-roles opens up room for antirealist views in normative ontology rather than forces one to 
adopt a very strong form of normative realism. 
21 I leave it open here whether, like truth-conditionalism, inferentialism should be seen as a global view of 
meaning. If it is, normative inferentialism is an application, which draws a contrast between the normative 
and the non-normative in terms of type of inferential role. 
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explain why it can be used in an attempt to justify it. The idea is that it is by standing in 
inferential relations to intentions (to action) that ethical claims are of the right inferential 
category to be made in response to demands for justification of an action. For example, 
if you give some money to charity, and then someone asks you, ‘Why did you do that?’, 
you can typically say, ‘Because giving to charity is a good thing to do.’ That is, you can 
answer, in the order of reasons, by making an ethical claim. Ethical inferentialism 
explains why this is so.22 
The other main advantage of ethical expressivism was its claim to avoid 
queerness/placement worries generated by the practicality of ethical concepts. Here, it’s 
difficult to assess the relative merit of inferentialism because it’s difficult to say when the 
inferentialist semantic idea, viz., that claims mean what they do in virtue of their 
inferential roles, commits one ontologically. Some inferentialists (e.g. Dummett) seem 
attracted to antirealism across the board, in which case ethical inferentialism would 
obviously be just as ontologically parsimonious as ethical expressivism, but only on pain 
of deconstructing the whole issue of ontology. Other inferentialists (e.g. Sellars, Harman) 
seem willing to reconstitute the notion of representing the world within the inferentialist 
framework. However exactly they do this, as long as there is room for viewing some 
claims as not completely representational because of their inferential relations to 
expressions of intentions, ethical inferentialism can argue that ethical claims fit into this 
latter category and thereby retain the advantage of ontological parsimony claimed by 
ethical expressivists. The idea would be to think of some concepts as bearing no direct 
inferential connection to intentions, and so not having a distinctively practical inferential 
role. These concepts could be viewed as the descriptive or representational concepts, 
whose deployment in basic assertions commits the speaker to the existence of the 
corresponding fact.23 For example, ‘x is red’ could then be viewed as committing one to 
the fact that x is red. By contrast, other concepts could then be thought of as lacking this 
commitment precisely because of their distinctively practical inferential role (and the 
corresponding difference in ‘directions of fit’). Assuming that ethical concepts belong in 
the latter category, ethical inferentialism would have a parallel way to avoid 
queerness/placement worries to the ethical expressivist.24 
The ostensible advantages of an expressivist approach have not seemed as weighty 
in the meta-epistemological debate about the meaning of epistemic claims as they may 
seem in the meta-ethical debate. However, in the case of queerness/placement worries, I 
think this may have resulted from mere oversight. If we conceive of them as normative, 
epistemic facts and values seem to me to be just as difficult to locate in the natural world 
as ethical facts and values. For one thing, epistemic concepts seem to resist analysis in 
nonnormative terms. For another, epistemic norms seem to be categorical and not 
hypothetical, in the sense that their normative force doesn’t depend on the contingent 
and personal aims or desires of the agents to whom they apply.25 In any case, to the 
                                                
22 You might also be able to answer in the order of causes by saying ‘Because I approve of giving to 
charity.’ This exhibits the ambiguity of the question ‘Why did you do x?’ Ethical inferentialism as I am 
conceiving of it is consistent with this response in the order of causes, but it denies that such a response is 
adequate in the order of reasons. 
23 At least, this could be viewed as a necessary condition for such commitment. Things may be more 
complicated depending on one’s view of ontological commitment. 
24 What about views which see ethical claims as having both practical and theoretical inferential 
connections? On the present account, as long as a claim like ‘x is good’ commits one to ‘I shall promote x’, 
it has a practical inferential role and so does not commit one ontologically to the fact that x is good. 
However, it might imply, e.g. that x is approved of by many people, and this then could commit one to the 
fact that x is approved of by many people. 
25 Compare Kelly (2003) and my discussion of Kornblith (2001) in Chrisman (2008: 354-8). 
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extent that ethical inferentialism retains resources for claiming ontological parsimony over 
truth-conditionalist views of the meaning of ethical claims, epistemic inferentialism will do 
so as well. So, if epistemic facts and values are queer enough to make ontological 
commitment to them a theoretical liability, epistemic inferentialism will retain some of 
the advantage of epistemic expressivism. 
As I mentioned above, the expressivist’s easy explanation of the motivational force 
of ethical discourse, does not seem to carry over to epistemic discourse. We can, of 
course, make some pretty reliable predictions about what someone who affirms certain 
epistemic claims will do. For example, there may be a tight connection between claiming 
‘I know that p’ and being motivated to act as if p is true. However, it seems that this has 
nothing specifically to do with the claim’s being an epistemic claim. We can just as well 
make such predictions from someone who asserts that p. 26  
Nonetheless, it seems to me that epistemic discourse is practical in a different 
sense. As with ethical claims, I think epistemic claims can be made in the attempt to 
justify certain actions. Which epistemic claims can be used to justify which actions is a 
matter of considerable debate.  Some epistemologists think knowing that p justifies 
asserting that p or acting as if p is true, while others think being justified in believing p is 
enough to justify these actions.27 Whatever exactly the correct account is, if some 
epistemic notions serve as the norm of some kinds of actions, then epistemic discourse 
exhibits a sort of practicality in the order of reasons that demands explanation. Epistemic 
inferentialism provides this explanation by construing epistemic predicates as 
inferentially related to the predicates by which we express intentions. 
Thus, it seems to me that normative inferentialism – with its ethical and epistemic 
species – will be at least as well off as normative expressivism vis-à-vis the alleged 
advantages of the latter view. And, since normative inferentialism is based on a view of 
concepts, including especially ethical and epistemic concepts, as inferential nodes rather 
than classificatory devices, it will overcome one of the core drawbacks of normative 
expressivism: its impoverished conception of normative concepts. 
 
5. TOWARDS A VIABLE SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY IN 
PRAGMATISM 
 
In many ways, the sort of epistemic inferentialism for which I have been arguing here is 
inspired by a sort of pragmatism about words and concepts that encourages us to look 
for their social-practical roles rather than referents in order to understand their meaning. 
However, it’s a pragmatism which makes a distinction between normative concepts like 
‘knows’ or ‘good’ and descriptive concepts like ‘water’ or ‘heat’.  The difference will be 
not in which concepts have inferential connections but in the inferential connections 
between these concepts and action.  In my view, normative concepts embed the concept 
‘ought’ and this we should understand in terms of its inferential connections to 
intentions to action.  I think this allows us to view normative concepts as playing some 
essentially nondescriptive social-practical role. 
Because other pragmatists sometimes say things sounding roughly like this, I’d like 
                                                
26 Of course, on some accounts of assertion, asserting that p commits one to ‘I know that p’; however, 
even if that’s right, it’s still unclear that the implicit knowledge claim is providing the link to motivation 
rather than the explicit claim that p. 
27 Consider the debate over whether knowledge is a ‘norm of action’ among, for instance, Pollack and Cruz 
(1999: ch. 5), Williamson (2005), Stanley (2005), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Neta (2008), Brown 
(2008). 
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to conclude by distinguishing the pragmatist social epistemology an epistemic 
inferentialist should allay himself with from some other similar ideas. 
As I mentioned above, pragmatists often challenge the standard approach to doing 
meta-epistemology. For example, Rorty (1979, 1995) suggests that epistemic concepts are 
primarily terms of praise. This allows him to cast the endless debate about the nature of 
knowledge as stemming from a failure to recognize that ‘knows’, like ‘good’, is not a 
word that picks out something with a nature. In a somewhat different vein, Craig (1990) 
proposes to approach the concept of knowledge by investigating what role the 
introduction of such a concept would have served in human coordination in community, 
much like Hobbes tried to understand the concept of justice by investigating what role 
the introduction of such a concept would have served in human coordination in 
community. Thus, Craig’s account of ‘knows’ construes it as (initially) a way to tag 
reliable informants; what it takes for someone to be deserving of such a tag will largely 
be down to the varying specific information tracking and transmitting needs of different 
groups of people and not some underlying ‘nature of knowledge’.28 
Both of these approaches to understanding epistemic concepts have met 
significant resistance, which is I think due to the vague sense that they undermine the 
objectivity of epistemic concepts and discourse. If epistemic terms are used merely to 
praise people’s beliefs in a special epistemic way, and different people find different sorts 
of things to be worthy of epistemic praise, then there will be no objective answer to first-
order epistemic questions. Similarly, if epistemic terms are used to tag reliable 
informants, but there is no specific measure of reliability one must achieve to deserve 
such a tag, then there will be no objective standard for our epistemic claims. 
Despite this worry, I think it’d be wrong to doubt that epistemic concepts are used 
to praise and tag; it’s just that they seem to do or be something more. If the view of 
epistemic concepts as devices of praise or tagging encourages something like the 
expressivist semantics for epistemic claims that I discussed earlier, I think the 
inferentialist semantics that I have proposed to view as expressivism’s successor (both in 
meta-ethics and meta-epistemology) offers a more nuanced view of the essentially social 
function of epistemic concepts and, thereby, a way to view them as doing more than 
merely praising and tagging.  
The idea would be to treat epistemic concepts as nodes of inferential relations, 
which are ossified and perpetuated by the social-linguistic practice of users of these 
concepts in human linguistic community as they faced certain needs. Thus, there will be 
good pragmatic reasons to explain why it is better for us to use concepts embodying 
these inferential roles rather than some other concepts embodying some other inferential 
roles. However, once we are using the concepts we have good reason to use, since they 
embody specific inferential roles, there is an objective answer to questions about when 
they can be correctly applied and what follows from such an application. (Compare: an 
inferentialist about logical concepts usually holds that there is an objective answer about 
the correct application of, and what follows from a conjunction or negation.) This is why 
I have taken my inspiration from other pragmatists about knowledge, like Brandom 
(2000: ch. 3) and Rosenberg (2002: ch. 5-6) who embed their pragmatism about 
epistemic concepts in a broader pragmatism about concept possession and use more 
generally that underwrites an inferentialist treatment of these concepts. 
The objectivity for which this move makes room is not the objectivity of some sort 
                                                
28 These ideas are related to Austin’s suggestion that ‘When I say ‘I know’, I give others my word’(1979: 
99). However, I take it Rorty and Craig want their ideas to extend to third-personal ascriptions of 
knowledge as well. 
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of Realism about the relevant kinds of predicates and concepts that they express (e.g. 
moral, epistemic, logical, etc.). Rather, it’s the kind of objectivity sought by Kant’s 
discussion of pretty much all of the concepts that interested him. His idea is that we can 
establish our unconditional right to use the concepts without needing to establish access 
to properties in the world that these concepts purport to represent. The value I see in 
treating this as stemming from the social function of epistemic discourse is that it 
encourages investigation into why it is useful to use epistemic concepts the way that we 
do. And this is the sort of investigation that single-minded focus on the truth conditions 
of epistemic claims (invariantist or contextualist) or even on the expressive role of 
epistemic claims (representationalist or expressivist) is likely to hinder rather than help.29 
                                                
29 I’d like to thank an audience at the University of St. Andrews as well as J. Adam Carter, Georgi 
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